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The Unpopularity and Improbability
of the Insanity Defense

William H. Weaver*

Go ntrmy to popular beli~f, the insa11ity defense applies to a IJeJJ narrow range
ofmental illnesses, is rrtrely succes.rfit! in trial, and will usually land the defendanr in an asylum for a longer period <
{time than he or s/;e would have spent
in jail. 7l;is article will explore t/;e complexities o_(the insaniq deje11se.

T

he insaniry defense is arguably one of the most inaccurately portrayed
legal topics. The media jumps at every chance to diagnose a questionable
suspect as insane. Famous movies ranging from the Jimmy Stewart classic
Anatomy ofa Murder ' to the recent thriller Batnum Begins 1 depict how the insaniry defense troubles prosecutors. Even John Grisham's first novel 1 revolved
around an insaniry case. The average person is thus led to believe that the insanity defense is common, requires the testimony of one psychiatrist for the
defense, and places the criminal in a comfortable institute for a few months:1
However, the insanity defense is actually a comp lex and ra rely used plea.
It is successful with few mental illnesses and poses considerable difficulry to
defense lawyers who choose to use it outside of an arrangement with the
prosecutor.
This article will explain the insanity defense and the d ifficulry posed to
lawyers who choose to use it. The article will (I) explain the term insanity
from a legal perspective, (II) show why certain mental illnesses do or do nor
apply, and (I II) illustrate the difficulty and improbabiliry of proving insaniry.

I. Insanity
lnsan iry means (I) a lack of unde rstanding that prevents one from knowing right from wrong or (2) an unsoundness of mind that prevents one from
• W illiam Weaver received h is bachelor's lkgree in philosophy from Brigham Young
U ni versity in April. William will auend law school at a future date.
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being able w conrrol his or her behavior. The word insane is a legal term ; it
is nor a medical term .' Psychiatrists do not use the word insane because it is
too simplistic; that is, there are too many difTerenr menral illnesses ro use
such a generic word as insane. The word insane is used in rhe legal system ro
describe one whose mental illness excuses him from criminal responsibility.
This menral illness must either prevenr the accused from knowing right from
wrong at the rime of the act 6 or prevent the accused from being able to control his or her behavior 7 at the time of the act in order ro acquit him from
crimi nal responsibility. At the federal level, the Supreme Court offered an official ruling:
lr is~ ~~ affirmative defense ro a prosccwion under any h :deral stature rh ar. :11
th e rime of the commission of the acts consriwring the oflense, the ddc ndant,

as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable ro appreciate th e n:lwre and quality or rhe wrongfulness of his acrs. Mcnral disease or defect does
not otherwise consrirure a defense.•

At this point it will be beneficial to examine the history of the insanity defense and the evolution of its rulings in courL The first relevant case involving
mental deficiency occurred in England in 1841. A Scottish man named Daniel
M'Naughten believed he was the carger of a conspiracy involving the Pope and
British Prime Minister, Robert Peel. M' Naughten traveled to 10 Downing
Street to ambush Peel, bur mistakenly shot and ki lled Peel's secretary. During
trial, several psychiatrists testified that M' Naughren was delusional. The jury
Anatomy ofa Murder, Columbia Pictures ( I 979).
' Batman Begim. Warner Bros. (2005).
1
Joh n Grisham, A Time To Kill ( 1992).
• I8 Eric Silver, C~rmcn Cirincione & Henry J. Steadman, Denl)'tbologizi11g lnllrnmut•
f'eraptiom ofThe InsaniTy Deji-nse, L:l\v & Hum. Bch~v., o3- 70 (No. I , Feb. 1994).
' The American l'sychiarric Associarion, '!be lmnnity Defense,
http://www.psych.org/ public_info/ insanity.cfm ?pf=y (last visited May 20, .200'\)
(rh csc principles will also be explained and l'Xa mined furrhc.:r rhroughou1 rhe body
of th e paper).
" StilT/' v. Bttrbrri. 149 N.Y. 256 (1896); see STIITe v.Jnmrs, 96 N.J.L 132, 152 (N.J. Cr.
App .• 192 I); Contra Commomw,tfr!J v. Cooper. 219 Mass. l (Mass. Sup Cr..
19 14).
' Morgnnv. Sitlfl!, 130 N. E. 528 (Sup. Cr. Ind., 192 1) .
" 18 U.S.C:., chI , §1 7.
1
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found that M'Naughten was not guiiC)' by reason of insaniry. Afrer an appellate ruling-demanded by none other than the Queen herself-it was
held that a person could be fou nd criminally excused if he or she was unable
to know the difference between right and wrong at the time of the crime.''
T his case formed what is known as the first test of insanity: determining if
the defendanr knew the difference berween right and wrong at the time of
the crime.
This ruling was later considered by courts in the United States but was
found to be far too narrow. Instead of ruling along the same line as the
"M'Naughten Rules," the courts also began to accom modate for uncontrollable impulses. In Parsons v. Alabama (1886), the State Supreme Court
opined that a person was not guilty by reason of insanity if he o r she had lost
"free agency" as a result of mental disease. This case marked the beginning
of an insaniry defense that allowed the accused to know right from wrong
but still be found "not guilty" due to the inability to control behavior at the
time of the crime. T hus was born the second definition: determining
wherher or nor the defendant was able ro control behavior. If the defendant
d id not know the difference betvveen right and wrong, or was not able co
conrrol his behavior, then he or she is excused from criminal responsibility. "'
Common Mental Illnesses
The purpose of this article is not to provide an exhaustive look into the
insanity defense, but merely to dispense of the common misconception that
every "crazy" person can successfully use the insanity defense. T hus, it is beneficial to point out some of the more common menral illnesses that qualify
for the insanity defense, as well as common mental illnesses that do nor.
Based on the definition of insanity, certain types of mental illness do
not excuse the accused from criminal responsibility, namely, mental illnesses that do not independently and directly cause the action.11 For this
., Norvallv1orris, "Wrong" in the M'Nrmghten Rules. 16 Mod. L. Rev., 435-440 (No. 4,

19'53).
"' Henry Wcihofcn, Cnpt1tity to Apprednte "Wrongfulness" or "Criminnlity"under the
A. L.l.-Modell'nllll Code Test ofMmlill Re.<po11Sibilil)•. 58, & I~S., 27- 31 (No. I.
Mar. 1967) (study of d1e current A.L. I. MoJcl Penal CoJc 'Jcsr).
II John p Meagher, Crime and lnsnni~y:
l.egnlns Oppo.red to the Medicnl View, find the
Most Lommonb• A.uerled Defmses, 14 J. Crim. 1.., Crirninolo~,ry. 46-61, at 47
(No. I, May 1923).

n,e
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reason, paranoia cannot be effectively employed in an insanity defense.
Paranoia does not include hallucinations. Paran oia is merely a tendency of
the agent roward excessive or irrational suspiciousness and distrustfulness
of others. T hus, paranoia fails the legal definiti ons of insani ty. While th e
agent may be chronically distrustful , he or she srill knows righr from
wrong and can still conrrol behavior.
Eccen tricities of character also fa il to excuse the accused from criminal
responsibility.u For example, a woman with an extremely short temper srill
knows right from wrong. Although the argument could be made that she was
unable ro control her behavior because of rhe inability to act in any orher way
(thus making her a slave ro her rnenra l illness), this defense still does nor mee t
the insani ty defense criteria.
Hysreria is another example of an illness that is nor classified as insanity.
Hysteria is behavior exhibiting overwhelm ing or unmanageable fear or emotional excess. One could make a good argument that such a condition does fir
under the definition of insanity. However, since any criminal could claim an
"unmanageable fear" of f.1ilure (financial, social. personal, etc.), anyone could
be held as irresponsible.u Moreover, ir has rcm<lined impossible to prove <1
causal relationship berween hysteria and the lack of understanding of criminality or the inability ro control behavior. Thus, for legal purposes hysteria also
fai ls to qualify as insanity.
Insani ty is an incredibly narrow term. If there is any room for argumenf
(as in rhe examples previously rnenrioned), then the accused cannot be excused
from responsibility. Some of these types of illnesses can, however, lessen the degree of murder. If rhe illness removes motive, which is necessary for first-degree
murder, rhen the defendant will nor be charged wid1 murder in the first degree.
A mental illness rhat causes delusions will sometimes excuse the accused
from responsibility. To do so, ir must be a specific type of delusion. Like insanity, delusion- in a legal context- has a very narrow definition. To be considered an act of insanity, a delusion must prevent the accused from seeing rhe
wrongfuln ess of the acr . Almost all delusions of rhis sort are commonly called
hallucinations: a perception of objects with no reality. In the broad sense, a
"See /'eop!r.l'. Girrprmrr, 102 N.Y. 238. (1886). Sec also \>:lit/is v. Peoplr. 32 N.Y. 7 15
( 1865).
" Meagher at 57.
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delusion is a false belief that cannot be corrected by reason.' 1 However, for a
mental illness which produces delusions to make an agent legally insane, the
delusions must be mental, not merely moral; i.e., they cannot be mere notions
or impressions, odd ideas, or hastily formed opinions.
Obsession, under an extremely narrow definition, can also remove the
accused from criminal responsibility. To do so, in the obsession there must
be no deliberation, no intention, nor passion (e.g., anger, jealousy, or revenge) acting consciously. The obsession can not be the result of any interior
facto r (such as lust), only an exterior (and thus, usually unknown) factor.
Such obsessions usually lead to compulsions. Thus, since rhe compulsion
(e.g., ro kill) is the result of something completely unconscious, the agent
cannot act in any other way at all. He cannot, therefore, be held responsible
because he is unable to act in any other way." It is important to note rhat
such cases are among the rarest of insanity defenses since most com pulsions
are not crim inal."' ln hKt, they are usually trivial, such as having to Aick the
light switch ftve rimes before leaving a room . Also, obsessions do nor hinder the agent from knowing right from wrong, so most people wi th obsessions do everything they can to prevent themselves from acting upon their
obsessions.

The Difficulty of Proving Insanity
So far everything presented may seem easily argued against. T har is
true- it is. For this very reason, insanity defenses are only very rarely upheld
because it is so difficult to prove that rhe accused's mental illness classifies
him or her as insane. Successful defendants must have very objective and
concrete evidence to prove insanity. Justice McLean, of the U.S. Supreme
Courc, said that the abil ity ro discriminate between right and wrong can best
be ascertained from the acts of the individual himself (as showing a sense of
guilt, attempts to escape punishment, etc.) and not by any medical theory. 17
As such, the most common evidence of insanity is usually the testimony of
" ld
n

at

51.

Regina v. Barton, 3 Cox Cr. Ca. 275. See also Flanagnntl. People, 52 N.Y. 467 (1873)
See ;tlso People v. Cl11pemer, I 02 N.Y. 238 (1886); US. v. Holmes. I Cliff. 98 (Me.
Cir. Cr.. I RSS).

•·· Meagher at S6.

' 7aylor v. Commonwealth. 109 Pa. 262. (1885).
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rhe defendant himself, and not rhe testimony of an expert psychologist. If the
defendant resrifies rhar he can nor recall a single detail of the act, for example,
such a lapse could be used as evidence of insanity (although rhar wou ld nor
be enough evidence). Expert psychologists can be useful, bur it is hard for
them to prove that the defendant was insane at the exact time of rhe act.
Defendants must have some ocher type of evidence to prove insanity such as
a brain tumor, a history of mental illness, rhe fact that the defendant is srill
acting insane, etc. However, none of these conditions alone is sufficient to
prove insanity ;I[ rhe exact rime of the act.
T his also leads to the question of burden of proof. The dilemma is ourlined well by Drs. James F. Hooper and Alex M. McLearen:
Defining 1he burden of proof presems an01 hcr issue in the insanity defense. Who
has 10 prove whar and how do rh <.y prove i1? Since the average ciriu:n is presumed
ro be sane, if they claim insanity, who deci de~? Does the prosecution have w
prove defendants are not insane. or do the people who ask the court to lind 1hem
not guilty hy reason ofinsaniry have w jusri l}- 1h cm ~d vcs? Mosr srares have gone
with rhe latter, but it ccrrainly has nor always been that way. In rhe afrcrma1h of
1hc Hinckky case, many states shifted 1hc burden of proof ro the defi:ndant.
' I'here has also bet•n discussion on the amounr of proof required. Should
insani1y he.: proved only by 5 1 perccn1 (e.g., a preponderance of evidence), or
docs it need a standard of "beyo nd a reasonable doubt">Genera lly, laws give rh c
benefi1 10 1he accused and logically wo uld nor req ui re more than the preponderance standard.'•
" James F. Hooper & Alix M. McLearen, Dors thr lnstlnity Deftme Haven l.l'f,itilllnte Role?
19 Psychiatric ' limes, Iss. 4, April 2002. St'C also Co1wnoml'mlrh v. Dnle (Pa.), I 07
Arl. 743; Nomil'itle. /ns,mil)\ Burden ofJ>roof.6 Va. L. Rev. 218,218 (Dec. 191 9) (1hc
question of burden of proof also raises rhe question of how ro prove insanity, which is
not the l·ocus of the paper but will he bridly c.: xamill(:d here in regard w experr witnesses (so as 10 further prove rhe difficulty of an insaniry defense). Experts may giw an
opinion only as to s;miry, nor as to rcsponsihiliry. First, expc:n opinions may be based
on personal examination of rhe accused and on <.:vidence heard: See Shelling. I I Ohio,
S. and C. I~ Dec. 198 1. Second, experts may give opinion on rhcir observations of the
prisoner- without the prisoner's conscm or warning: Sc.:c Bw1 v. !:)rnte, ' lex. Cr. App.,
40 S.W. Rep. II)(){). ' l11ird, testimony uf an cxp<:rt witness who has examined thc.: accused cannot be objected ro since rhc :~ccusc:d can nut testifY ro his own insanirywhich also applies ro expert wiuwsses fix 1hc prosl'Ctnion: See People L~ Kemmle1; 199
N.Y. 580; Scr also People v. 7i·uck, 170 N.Y. 203 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1902)).
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Of course, all of this is relevant only in a theoretical/ideal setting. If the
insanity defense seems complicated to define and apply for lawyers and
judges, then it is going robe only more difficult for a jury to decide.
In fact, insanity cases are arguably the most likely to produce verdicts that
are unfavorable co the public for this very reason: Because of the complexity
of instructions, psychiatric testimony, and evidence used in an insaniry case,
jurors often throw it all our and appeal to nothing more than their own ideas
of insanity, morality, and justice. The verdict was so appalling to the public
in rhe infamous Hinckley case, for example, that the jurors were forced totestifY m a Senate Subcommittee on their decision. 1• Similar investigations were
done by the media in the M'Naughten case and the Jeffrey Dahmer case.1"
Norman Finkel and Sharon Handel have studied, for some 10 years,
how jurors decide in cases of insanity. After looking at every actual case as
well as experimenting with several mock-trial scenarios in which jurors were
asked how they came to their decision, Finkel and Handel determined that
there is no one way to guarantee a verdict in either direction. lt does not depend on rhe instruction the judge gives, wh ich of the two qualifying definitions for insanity is used, nor who receives the burden of proof. Because of
the complexity of insanity, at the end of the day most jurors will just appeal
to their own definition of insanity:
A legal rest rhar docs nor adequately capture rhe essence of ins~niry, as undcrsrood hy ordinary citizens, invites disregarding or reconstructing. Jurors arc
likely to hear such instruction as permission w usc their own lights, or, in Lord
Cooper:~ view, to simply retire and ask themselves, "Is rhis man mad or is he
not?'' If this happens, construals and verdicts rhar are perplexing and rrouhling
will likely increase. In response, rhe public is more likely ro disparage rhc jury,
or rhc hw, or both. A law that does not command respccr (i .e.. because it £1ils
ro comport) and docs nor instruct incites public disconrcm and jury revoirs.
Both citizens and jurors need more education and instruction to make their
views come closer ro the law's, or rhc law and legal rest ought ro be cha nged in
rhc direction of harmonizing legal and lay notions.' '
'"Norman J. Finkel & Sharon F. Handel, How jtnw:; Construt '!mdnity.' I3 Law and
Human Behavior 41. 41 - 59 (Mar. I 989).
"' Seen. 25.
1
' Meagher at 57.
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Proving insanity is extremely d ifficu lt. Thus, it shou ld be no surprise rhe
only thing rarer than an insanity d efense is an insan ity defense that is upheld.
Even in "celebri ty" cases, the legendary John Hinckley's verdict is unique-the
insanity defense failed for "Son of Sam" murder, o r David Berkowirzl!, Jack
Ruby,u Unabomber Ted Kaczynski ,:• Jeffrey Dahmer/' and John DuPonr.!"
The American Psychiatric Association says:
The insanity dctc nse is nor ofrcn used, and when used is frequently unsu cc~·ss
ful. According ro a 1991 eighr-state study funded by the Narional lnstirure of
" Berkowirz (who claimed to receive his ki lling orders from a neighbor's dog) confcsscd
to rhe police upon his arrest, rims making ir nigh impossible for his lawyers ro go
hack and prove rhar either he was ignor.tnr of rhc morality of rhc siruatio n or that
he was compelled to commit the crime. The c;~se is similar ro rhe reccnr Oylc~ki
ca~e: Dyleski was found to have had sex with his girlfriend immeJiau:ly after the
murJer, thus showing that he had felt guilty for the crime anJ was then.:fim: .tware
of his choice anJ irs immorality and criminaliry.
''Sec John K;tplan, 'lYle Tn~d oj}llck Ruby, The Nor,thlc 'Irials Library. 1992. (Ruby, who
; hot l.cc ~larvcy Oswald, used the J cfcnsc thar his f.unily had a hismry of mcneal illncss and rhat the flashing cam~ras had rriggt' rcd a reaction. The Jefcnse fitilcd hecause II(' had rold Dallas policcm~n thm the American people would vicw him "as <I
hero." rhat he had m<tintained Dallas's "good n:puration," and that the murdcr was
proof that "Jews have gms." From these starcmcms it was proven that Ruby kr11.:w the:
JifTercncc b.:twl>cn righ t and wrong and w;ts not acting on compulsion).
:. Sc:c 'led Orr ley. li-t/ Ktmqmki, C rim e.: "IV\ Crime Library,
Imp:// www.cri melibrary.com/terrorists_spics/tcrrurist,/kacL.ynski/1. html (last vi~iteJ
on 1-'c:h. II 2006) (rhe courr-appoimeJ p'ychiatrist Jiagnosc:J Kaczynski with paranoid schiw phrenia, which was insuH1cicnt ro prove Kaczynski incompctcm w
sr;111d rrial (or gain acguirral), bur K<tcqnski rejc:cted the plea alrogcrher and plcltd
guilty. He Iacer tried ro widtdraw tht· plea and rcrurn to the plea of insanity, but
was not nllowcd. T his decision was upheld hy rhc 9th Circuit Court of Appeals).
"Sec 1~· 1 : Staff. I mrried if 100 fin; !hat's j(Jr mre, Psychology -l(lday (May 1992), available ar
http://www.psyehologycoJay.comhlrriclcs/indcx.php?tcrm=pro-1992050 1000022.xrnl&print= I (lasr visited Feb. II , 2006) (if tht~re is one case dtat cowrcd
every single aspect of rhe insanity ple-J. it would h,wc co he rhe Oahmer case. Numerous psychiatrists rcstifleJ for the Jcl{.nse, most giving multiple diagno~e~. and yet rhc
p)ychiarrisrs who rcstificd for the prosecution all held rhar Dahmer was s:u1c. Most
who have commcnred on rhe OahnH:r case s,tid that by rhc end rhe jury wa~ )0 bafAcJ . unimprcsS('d, and confuscJ by the p)ychiarric community rhar they rhrcw it all
out and entered a verdict of guilry).
''' St:c D.:bbk· Goldberg, jolm DuPom Found Guilty. Mentally !II, Washington Po~r . Fch.
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Mental Health, the insanity defense was used in less than one percent of the
cases in a representative sampling of cases before those states' county courts.
The study showed that only 26 pcrcem of those insanity defenses were argued
successfully. Most studies show that in approximately 80 pcrcem of the cases
where a defendanr is acquirtcd on a "nor guilty by reason of insanity" find ing,
it is because the prosecmion and defense have agreed on the appropriateness of
rhe defense before rrial. ,.

Along those same lines, Hooper and McLearen show that "approximately
70 percent o f insan ity acqui£tals result from agreem ents made between opposing atrorneys, in w hich the prosecution agrees that society would be better served by placing the defendant in treatment, rather tha n in prison ."
Furthermore, "not guilty by reason of insa nity" may not always be w hat
a criminal wanrs. Studies show that persons fou nd not guilty by reason of insani ry, on average, are held in mental institutes as long as- and often longer
than- persons found guilty and sent co p rison for sim ilar crimes. 1' Since insanity defenses have become more frequent fo llowing the Hinckley case,
most states have formed formal review boards to handle the determ ination
of insanity and four states (Utah, Idaho, Monrana, and Kansas) have legislatively abolished the insanity defense. Many stares also rule out the second insanity definition-being able to control behavior- and consider only the
flrsc defi ni tion- t he abil ity to distinguish right from wrong. New
H am pshire's standard is that rhe crim inal act w as a direct resul t of the accuser's mental illness."''

26, 1997. ar A I (DuPont's insanity plea failed for probably rhe same reason as
Ruby's: afrcr murdering his victim DuPont retreated to his mansion, held the police at bay for two days, and asked fi>r his lawyer over I 00 times- all evidence that
Dul'onr was aware thar whar he had done was wrong. lr was proven, however, that
DuPont was mentally ill. His sentencing was therefore reduced to third-degree
murder).
,. See American Psychiatric Association, supm note 5.
'' Sec American Psychiatric Association, supm note 5. See also Eric Silver, Punishment or
7iwrnnmt?: Comparing tbe !.engths ofConfinemmt ofSuaessfid 1111d UnmccesffuL Insanity Defendrmts, 19 Law & Hum. Bchav. 375, 375- 388 (Aug. 1995): Vicki L.
Plaur. Punisbment t'. 71·eatment oftbe (,'uilty but J'vfenttt!ly Ill 74 ). Crim. 1.. &
Criminology 428, 428-56 (1983) .
.., See American Psychiatric Associarion, supm note 5.
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Despite the difficulty of using the insanity defense, there are certain benefits. In December 2 003, the lawyers for Lee Boyd Malvo decided to use the
insanity d efense in the Beltway sniper shootings. Legal experts claim tha{
Malvo's lawyers had no intention of getting an acquittal. Instead , the insanity defense was used to allow the defense to introduce otherwise inadmissib le
evidence about Malvo's upbringing, his relationsh ip with John Allen
Muhammad, and his mental state. All this evidence was su pposedly intended
to gain the jury's sympathy so that it would not invoke the death penalty.
The jury found Malvo guilty and sentenced him to life in prison.·"'
Despite w hatever advantages a clever lawyer might find, it is clear that
the insanity defense is more often avoided , and few defense lawyers wonder
why. The insaniry defense covers a narrow list of mental illnesses, the illnesses themselves are difficult to prove using either of the two qualif),ing definitions for insani ty, and juries are prone to disregard evidence and
instruction when either is complex (which is likely). Furthermore, even if
the accused are found not gu il ty by reason of insanity, he, she, or they will
likely spend more time in a menral instirure thiln she wo uld have in jail had
they not opted co plead insane. For these reasons, the insani ty plea is rarely
used , and even more rarely successful.

" St-e Kevin Orcw, Tt·enagrr's Sanity Will Br. roms ofSec-ond Snipa Trial, CNN-I.aw Online. Nov. 2 1, 2003, http: //www.cnn. co m/2003/IAW/ J 1I 16/sprj.Jcsp.malvo.rrial/.

